elected a President who, as a candidate, was thought to favor a return to the gold standard. 4 In March 1982 a Gold Commission, mandated by Congress and appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, concluded that a restoration of the gold standard was not desirable, although it recommended a minor step in that direction. 5 Nevertheless, the return of the gold standard, though actively opposed by the Treasury, has remained a first priority for a small but highly articulate group of economists and writers who have popularized the concept of supply side economics and who consider a return to the gold standard essential to the success of supply side policies. ' In fact, legislation during the 1970's had already undone most of the legislative steps taken under Roosevelt's leadership to eliminate gold from American monetary law: citizens may now buy and sell gold freely, 7 and gold clauses are once again enforceable. 8 The Gold Commission recommended the further step of a "Treasury issue of gold bullion coins of specified weights," albeit "without dollar denomination or legal tender status." 9 Even if the movement toward a gold standard goes no further-and its future appears doubtful-the evolution in the role of gold in the half century since 1933 warrants study for its own inherent interest and because it sheds light on the meaning of any return to a gold standard. The emotion, ideology, and confusion surrounding public discussion of the gold standard can best be avoided by sober review of the evolving role of gold since the Roosevelt decisions. Emphasis here will be on the 1935 Gold Doc. No. 97-3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC REPORT (1981)]. 4 For President Reagan's pre-election position on gold, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1980, at D2, col. 1; id., Apr. 25, 1980, at A27, col. 1.
1 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ROLE OF GOLD IN THE DoMEs-

TIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS 1-21 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GOLD COMMIS-SION REPORT].
6 I refer particularly to Arthur Laffer, Lewis Lehrman, and Jude Wanniski. Lehrman was a member of the Gold Commission. See his minority report (filed jointly with Congressman Ronald Paul) in 2 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
I
To understand the Gold Clause Cases, it is useful to begin the analysis a half century earlier still, in 1879, when the United States first went on the gold standard. It is also useful to make a sharp, if somewhat unnatural, distinction between an international and a domestic gold standard.
The international gold standard, contrary to popular belief, had a relatively short life. It lasted only from 1879, when the United States resumed payments of specie (that is, gold coin) in redemption of its currency, until 1914, when that standard collapsed as one of the first casualties of World War I. The international gold standard enjoyed a partial revival from 1925, when Britain returned to it, until 1931, when Britain again left it, or at the latest until 1933, when the United States abandoned it. 1 The gold standard can also be thought of as a purely domestic set of legal rules. From that perspective one has an international gold standard only when nations accounting for the great bulk of international trade and investment have such a domestic standard. Indeed, the international gold standard was never much more than the international result and interaction of domestic gold standard rules. 2 A domestic gold standard may thus be in force in a particular country when it would be inaccurate to speak of an international gold standard. It is common to date the gold standard in Britain back to the early nineteenth" 3 or even the eighteenth century. 1 '
And one can say that during much of the first half of the nineteenth century the United States, although de jure on a bimetallic standard, had a de facto gold standard because the official ratio between gold and silver was such that by the inexorable workings GAmE 14-70 (1982) . In order to economize on space, I shall refer the reader to RuLEs OF TmE GAm for more detailed discussion of a number of points and particularly for more extensive documentation.
12 Id. at 23-24. 13 Id. at 24-25. 14 R. HAwTv, THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND RAcTIcE 66-68 (5th ed. 1947).
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Gold Clause Cases of Gresham's law only gold coin circulated. 15 The United States clearly was not on a gold standard for a period beginning in 1861, when the North, under the financial pressures of the Civil War, suspended specie payments.,, Gold coin continued to circulate freely although in limited quantity compared to the volume of paper money, which included United States notes made legal tender in satisfaction of debts. 1 7 In what was later called a dual monetary system, gold coin rose to a premium and fluctuated daily in value, as measured by paper money. 18 The resumption of specie payments did not occur until 1879, when the premium on gold disappeared, and thereafter gold coin exchanged at parity with paper money. Gold coin thenceforth was worth in paper money the face amount of the coin, 1 9 and the face amount equalled the market value of the gold content of the coin. 20 There was no reason for these values to depart from one another because one could redeem paper money and receive gold coin. Or one could turn in gold coin and receive paper. Similarly, gold bullion could be minted into gold coins and gold coins could be melted down to be sold as bullion. 2 1 In the Gold Standard Act of 1900 Congress eliminated the last vestiges of any role for silver as a monetary standard by declaring that "the dollar consisting of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine . . . shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain such parity." 2 This statutory parity " See K. DAM, supra note 11, [19] [20] 22 . It is more accurate to say that Gresham's law holds that cheap money drives out dear than that bad money drives out good. The precondition for its operation is a legally fixed relation between the prices of two kinds of currency and divergence of market prices from that fixed ratio. A fuller discussion of Gresham's law may be found in id. at 20. Before the Civil War, gold was overvalued at the mint; it was worth more as coin than as bullion on the market and hence was freely coined. 
1983]
policy was to play a crucial role in the Gold Clause Cases. Parity of gold coin, paper money, and bullion, simultaneously in force in all commercially important countries, was the hallmark of the international gold standard. One can see that fixed exchange rates would result from such national systems so long as gold could be imported and exported freely in each country. Moreover, using present-day terminology, gold was the principal international reserve asset, although after the Great War the increasing use of foreign exchange as reserves led the variant of the gold standard in operation from 1925 to 1933 to be called a "gold exchange" standard. 23 However, the essential element in the international gold standard-and this is a crucial point in contemporary discussions of a return to the gold standard-was that there was a close link between the domestic money supply in each country and its gold holdings. 2 4 It was an "essential element of the classical gold standard . . . that the money supply must be limited by the gold reserves and a change in the gold reserves should be followed by a change in monetary policy. '25 In part this link was reflected in "gold cover requirements," such as the provision of United States law specifying the value of gold that had to "back" issuances of currency. 26 More fundamental were the institutional arrangements in each country causing increased or decreased public gold holdings to lead respectively to a larger or smaller money supply.
7
Whether the circulation of gold coin was essential to a gold standard, either domestic or international, may be debated. Certainly many countries, though not the United States, suppressed gold coin circulation after World War I in order to concentrate gold reserves in their central banks in defense of their currencies.
8
But the free import and export of gold bullion in response to changing economic conditions left the gold standard essentially in- (1976) ) (emphasis added).
:3 See generally K. DAM, supra note 11, at 55-57, 64-69. 24 The process by which gold flows, under the international gold standard, financed payment imbalances and adjusted credit conditions and price levels is the subject of a vast amount of writing, which has continued to the present day. When, in his first week in office, Roosevelt took the United States off the gold standard, he was not forced to do so by circumstances of the kind that had earlier impelled Britain to abandon it. Though the depreciation of a number of other currencies had hurt U.S. exports and increased imports to the detriment of U.S. manufacturers and though the United States lost one-fifth of its monetary gold stock between September 1931 and July 1932, it nevertheless held more gold at the beginning of March 1933 than it had in 1929, the heyday of the post-War gold standard. 3 2 Rather, as we shall see later, Roosevelt chose to leave the gold standard in order to gain freedom to increase domestic prices, especially farm prices, without any constraints from the gold standard. Indeed, he wanted to use various gold transactions, domestic and foreign, to raise prices. 33 Roosevelt rapidly eliminated all of the elements of a gold stan- 
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The Gold Clause Cases and banking experts, such as Marriner Eccles and Representative Steagall, and the disparate members of the Committee for the Nation. 41 There was no unanimity, however, as to the methods for achieving inflation and the rationales offered as to why they would work. Roosevelt, with his famous "flexibility," appears to have selected method and rationale according to the needs of the moment. His goal was to achieve higher prices. But he was not a monetarist and his strategy turned less on inflating the money supply 42 (although breaking the link with gold facilitated this effect) than on direct means to increase prices. The National Recovery Administration's much publicized system of industrywide production cartels is a characteristic example. To Roosevelt, another means was devaluation of the dollar. The effect would be, in his view, to raise directly and proportionately the prices of farm products and raw materials traded internationally and perhaps to raise other prices as well.
43
Congressional authorization to devalue the dollar was obtained less than ten weeks after Roosevelt's inauguration. In accordance with the accepted view of the matter, the legislation was phrased in terms of authority to reduce the weight of the gold dollar."" Roosevelt did not exercise that authority immediately and indeed SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 464-66 (on the measures used to raise commodity prices). Roosevelt apparently did not favor inflation for its own sake. Rather he sought to offset the decline in producer prices that had already taken place. See 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 74-79. In July 1933 he told the London Economic Conference that his long-run goal was "the kind of dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope to attain in the near future." Id. at 265. waited until January 31, 1934, to do so. 4 5 Rather, at the behest of the Administration, Congress first took the precaution by a Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, of invalidating gold clauses in public and private contracts. 4 6 This Joint Resolution provided that "every provision... with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency... is... against public policy" and that all past or future obligations, "whether or not any such provision is contained therein . . . shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender. '47 One purpose, and in retrospect the most important purpose, was to give "private debtors with gold clause obligations ; . . protection and a prompt and clear definition of their legal position ' " 4 8 -in short, to assure that creditors would not be able to enforce gold clauses when the dollar was devalued.
Before discussing how the Supreme Court dealt with the Joint Resolution when it first came before it in 1935, it is worth noting how Roosevelt dealt with gold issues in the interim. The departure from the gold standard had permitted a sharp rise in the gold price even before the Joint Resolution. In addition, the dollar depreciated by nearly fifteen percent against the French franc (which was still on gold) between mid-April and early May 1933. 49 But Roosevelt, faced by a renewed decline in prices and agricultural unrest, was not content with market forces and sought to induce greater dollar depreciation over the course of the autumn of 1933 by a concerted gold buying program. 50 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation ("RFC") began to buy not merely newly mined U.S. gold but also existing gold in the world market. 51 markets. 5 8 The authority was promptly granted in the Gold Reserve Act and on January 31, 1934, the President proclaimed a new gold content of 15-5/21 grains 9/10 fine gold, a reduction to 59.06 % of the former weight, equal to an official gold price of thirty-five dollars an ounce. 59 The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 took one further step to eradicate remaining gold standard symbols. In Roosevelt's own words, the Act "abolished gold coin as a component of our monetary system." 6 0 All gold coin was to be withdrawn from circulation and formed into gold bars. 61 Even the Treasury was thenceforth to hold gold only in the form of bullion. 2 Gold was thereafter to be a commodity, not money. It could be sold for industrial and dental uses. Coin collectors could still hold gold coins but only those of numismatic value. 3 Although U.S. citizens could not hold gold in the United States, they could deal freely in gold "situated outside the United States," 6 4 a privilege not withdrawn until the Kennedy Administration. 5 [50:504
III
Gold Clause Cases chargeable at the nominal face amount." 8 The reasoning was straightforward. Congress had broad power over the value of money. The source of this monetary power was derived not merely from the coinage power expressly granted in the Constitution 9 but from the aggregate of the powers granted to the Congress, embracing the powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standards of weights and measures, and the added express power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the other enumerated powers.
1
In execution of those powers Congress had the power of "frustrating the expected performance of contracts, ' 71 and such an impact on private contractual relations did not constitute a taking under the fifth amendment. 72 Since, under the circumstances prevailing in 1933, gold clauses constituted an "actual interference" with its broad monetary powers, Congress had the power to invalidate such clauses. 73 As discussed below, the factual analysis leading to the conclusion that gold clauses interfered with the exercise of the monetary power is not wholly satisfactory. 4 The legal reasoning, on the other hand, is unexceptionable, particularly to a modernday reader accustomed to vast congressional power over the economy. Hence, unlike the private obligation cases where the Court had held that no fifth amendment taking had occurred, the taking was conceded but "just compensation" was held to require payment only at the $20.67 price. The theory was that even if gold coin had been paid out by the Treasury, the holder would have had no alternative but to return the coin to the Treasury and to be compensated at the official gold price. Since gold coin could not be sold at the $34.45 bullion price available to gold producers and since it was then unlawful to export gold coin in order to receive the world price, the holder was entitled to no more than the nominal value of the certificate, which was calculated at the $20.67 price. The Court emphasized that a gold certificate was currency, not a warehouse receipt for gold, but the decision did not turn on that point. In effect, price controls had held the price of gold certificates to $20.67, and so the holder was entitled to no more. 79 Perry [50:504
Gold Clause Cases
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a four-member plurality, ruled the Joint Resolution unconstitutional insofar as it applied to gold clauses in such obligations. 8 3 But the Court nonetheless relegated the holder of the government bond to receiving merely the face amount of $10,000 in legal tender currency. The Court reasoned that unlike the post-Civil War period, when coin and paper money floated in the marketplace at prices determined by supply and demand, the period of the Gold Clause Cases had a "single monetary system with an established parity of all currency and coins. 84 Even under the pre-1933 legislation, a gold coin could have been legal tender only for its face amount, not for the value of its gold content. Thus even if the bond had been paid in gold coin and even assuming that gold coin did not have to be surrendered to the government at the $20.67 price under the 1933 regulations, the bondholder could not have exchanged his gold coin at the thirtyfive dollar price because no recipient. would have been required to treat it as legal tender for more than its face amount. Moreover, he could not have exported the gold coin or sold it for its gold content. As a result, the holder had no legally cognizable loss of purchasing power. 5 Since there was no "actual loss," recovery of money at the gold value-$1.69 per $1.00 face amount of the bonds-would "constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense but an unjustified enrichment." 8 The reasoning on the lack of damages in Perry was convoluted and suspect, as a fledgling Harvard law professor, Henry Hart, made clear in justifying his conclusion that "[flew more baffling pronouncements, it is fair to say, have ever issued from the United Is See 294 U.S. at 346-58. Because Justice Stone, the fifth member of the five-man majority, concurred specially, there was no opinion of the Court in Perry. Stone's concurrence, id. at 358, was limited to the question of the claimant's entitlement "to receive from the United States an amount in legal tender currency in excess of the face amount of the bond," id. at 347. He aligned himself with Hughes in holding that there was "no damage because Congress, by the exercise of its power to regulate the currency, has made it impossible for the plaintiff to enjoy the benefits of gold payments promised by the Government." Id. at 360 (Stone, J., concurring). However, he refrained from ruling on any wider constitutional question, and thought it "undesirable, for the Court to undertake to say that the obligation of the gold clause in Government bonds is greater than in the bonds of private individuals." Id. at 359 (Stone, J., concurring 
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States Supreme Court. '87 Hart was anxious to show that the Joint Resolution was constitutional even as applied to government gold clause obligations. The reasoning of the Perry plurality on the constitutional issue was, however, less important to the future of gold than was the result, which rendered gold clauses just as ineffective in government obligations as in private obligations. 8 More interesting therefore are the economic and social reasons that led a majority of the Court to invalidate, de jure for private obligations and de facto for public obligations, solemn promises that had been bargained for with the very eventuality in mind that led to their invalidation-the depreciation of the currency in terms of gold.
IV
In considering the factual basis for the Court's finding of an "actual interference" with the monetary power of Congress, it is first useful to clear away an issue of interpretation of the gold clauses themselves. Were they "gold coin" or only "gold value" clauses? If the former, then the creditor could claim gold coin. The consequence of their enforcement might then be, as the Court reasoned in Norman, "to increase the demand for gold, to encourage hoarding, and to stimulate attempts at exportation of gold coin," which would indeed conflict with the congressional policy of calling in all privately held gold. 89 If, despite the explicit wording calling for payment "'in gold coin'" or "'in United States gold coin,' -9 the clauses could be interpreted as merely requiring payment of the present day currency equivalent of the promised gold coin, then no impact on gold holdings, public or private, could be anticipated. During the greenback period, the Supreme Court had been wont to construe gold clauses as "gold coin" clauses in order to protect creditors from the legal tender legislation. Gold Clause Cases of Lords 9 had more recently treated gold clauses as "gold value" clauses, however, the 1935 Supreme Court was willing to treat the clauses before them as "gold value" clauses. 9 4 Once that concession was made, the Court's concern to protect the congressional decision to "choose . . . a uniform monetary system, and to reject a dual system" 9 5 became irrelevant because gold value clauses could be enforced without according any monetary role to gold. It would suffice to determine the present market value of gold equal to coins of the weight and fineness referred to in the contractual clause-which in Norman was "'gold *coin of the United States of America of or equal to the standard weight and fineness existing on February 1, 1930.' "9
The question consequently became how requiring a private debtor to pay $1.69 instead of $1.00 for each face dollar of principal and interest would interfere with the monetary power of Congress. In attempting to give a satisfactory answer to that question, the Court emphasized the large volume of gold clause obligations. The result of enforcing the clauses, even on a gold value basis, would be "dislocation of the domestic economy. ' 97 The Court did not bother to explain the causation or nature of the dislocation. Rather, it contented itself with the rhetorical flourish that "[i]t requires no acute analysis or profound economic inquiry to disclose" the dislocation that would result if "debtors under gold clauses should be required to pay one dollar and sixty-nine cents in currency while respectively receiving their taxes, rates, charges and prices on the basis of one dollar of that currency." 9 8 Yet "analysis," whether "acute" or otherwise, of why it would harm the economy, as opposed to individual debtors, to give effect to bargained-for promises was totally lacking in the Gold Clause Cases. Some corporations might indeed become insolvent if the debt were interpreted to be $1.69 rather than $1.00, but that need not necessarily result in either lower output or higher unemployment in the economy. 
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The government's brief in Bankers Trust made some effort to calculate the impact of holding gold clauses valid. It analyzed debt service (interest plus amortization of principal) and concluded that enforcement of gold clauses on both public and private debts would raise annual debt service some $3.0 billion to more than $10.9 billion."' This was not an insubstantial amount in an economy with a gross national product of $55.8 billion. 100 But it was in no sense a monetary drain since every dollar paid was received by someone else. And then, as at other times, the principal of longterm debt was often refinanced.
The burden of debt service was largely attributable not to the gold clauses but to a sharp decline in the gross national product from $103. none of the parties made any attempt to justify invalidation of gold clauses (when construed as gold value clauses) on strictly economic grounds by evaluating the effects of enforcement using such economic criteria as production of goods and services or unemployment.
In the face of this paucity of economic evidence or even layman's economic reasoning, it is worth examining the possibility that something quite different motivated President Roosevelt, the Congress, and the Court. The most reasonable hypothesis is that the purpose of prohibiting the enforcement of clauses even on a gold value basis was to redistribute income from creditors to debt- 100 See ECONoMIc REPORT (1981), supra note 3, at 233 ( [50:504
Gold Clause Cases ors. Certainly the President in a moment of economic candor took the position that the purpose of the Joint Resolution was "to prevent unfair profits from accruing to a very small group of creditors and the placing of unfair burdens. . . on the corresponding debtors" through enforcement of gold clause promises. 103 Such profits he considered "unearned." He had wanted " [t] o restrict the 'unjustified enrichment'-the unearned profit from gold and foreign exchange-which at other times here and at all times in most other Nations was permitted to fall to a privileged few as a result of governmental monetary action. ' 104 The Court did not quite adopt the redistributive notion that it would be unfair to allow creditors to benefit from the enforcement of debtors' promises, but it did endorse the idea that enforcement would be unfair to the debtor in the context of a devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold. It is unfairness to the debtor, rather than any macroeconomic concept, that appears to lie behind the otherwise puerile observation previously noted that gold clause debtors would have to pay "one dollar and sixty-nine cents in currency while respectively receiving their taxes, rates, charges and prices on the basis of one dollar of that currency." 105 The willingness of the Court to endorse the redistributive desire to help debtors at the expense of creditors may seem rather odd when one considers that the actual obligors in the Gold Clause Cases were large railroads, banks, and the United States itself and that many of the bondholders were doubtless individuals, perhaps even "widows and orphans." But the government had gone out of its way to emphasize that gold clauses were common in farm and home mortgages. 10 
The University of Chicago Law Review
The Gold Clause Cases cannot, however, be written off as an exercise in populism. It seems apparent from the tone of the opinions that the majority felt that enforcement of the gold clauses would not merely be unfair to debtors but would provide a windfall to creditors. Certainly the government so argued. 108 How, one may ask, can it be a windfall to enforce a bargained-for promise in the very situation envisaged by the explicit words of the promise-a change in the value of the currency in terms of gold? 10 ' There are two possible answers to that question, one essentially illegitimate and the other somewhat more weighty.
The illegitimate answer would be to deny that anyone actually bargained for the gold clauses. Some of the arguments before the Court implied that the gold clauses were mere boilerplate that had been included in loan agreements and mortgages by lawyers from time out of mind without attention from the borrower and lender. 11 0 This boilerplate argument seems wrongheaded on two grounds. First, even if it were true that most or even all parties did not focus on the gold clause in their negotiations, it is hard to see why that should make any difference. Courts do not normally refuse to enforce form contracts merely because they are form contracts. Second, the gold clauses were originally inserted in contracts in the United States (unlike Great Britain, where gold clauses were relatively rare 1 ") for concrete reasons. These clauses increased in importance with the Civil War greenback experience when Congress, by giving paper money legal tender quality, benefited debtors at the expense of creditors with respect to pre-ex- 'x "Promises in contracts are not subject to defeat simply because they turn out to be to the advantage of the promisee. A contract is a bargain for enrichment, or for some other anticipated advantage, a bargain presumably made for satisfactory consideration." Hart, supra note 87, at 1080.
110 See, e.g [50:504 isting contracts." 2 Those creditors who had gold coin clauses were protected against inflation during the greenback period, and it would have been difficult for other creditors not to have learned their lesson, especially as the government itself issued gold clause obligations throughout the greenback period. " 3 The use of gold clauses received another boost from the free silver agitation of the late nineteenth century. 11 4 In short, if gold clauses had become a matter of form, it was for good economic reasons.
But the fact was that gold clauses were not placed in loan agreements and mortgages indiscriminately. Only about fifty-five percent of long-term obligations were subject to gold clauses. " 5 Something other than absence of mind must have led some parties to include gold clauses and others to leave them out. The government itself in its Perry brief recognized the need to compare obligations that included a gold clause with those that did not. " 6 In any case, the inclusion of a gold clause may be expected, on general principles, to have resulted in a lower interest rate since it protected the creditor, albeit quite imperfectly, against inflation. 117 The gold clause was, in short, a primitive form of indexation. " "' The government talked out of both sides of its mouth on this issue. In Bankers Trust it argued that, at least once Roosevelt obtained legislative authorization to devalue the dollar, it would have been impossible for the government to borrow without either including a gold clause or paying "prohibitive rates" of interest. " Yet the gov- 
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The University of Chicago Law Review ermnent argued in Perry that gold clauses were ineffectual: bonds sold at the same price, whether or not they contained a gold clause.120 This latter argument seems particularly fallacious, although selective nondisclosure of the underlying data prevents any close analysis of the government's argument. In the absence of information about the face interest rate, the fact that two issues sell at the same price tells us nothing about the effective interest rates. For example, the government attempted to show that two series of treasury bonds with essentially the same maturities, one with a gold clause and one without, sold roughly at par and at almost exactly the same price. Yet the gold clause bonds bore an interest rate of 3% % and the non-gold clause bond prices appear to have been derived by averaging prices for bonds ranging in face interest rate from 3 to 4 %.11 The midpoint of that range was 3 / %, well above the 33/8 % face yield for the gold clause bond. The natural conclusion would therefore have been that a higher interest rate was required when a gold clause was not used.
A somewhat more weighty argument for viewing the creditor as receiving a windfall if gold clauses had been enforced after the devaluation of the dollar in January 1934 has to do with the unusual nature of that devaluation. The argument would start from the proposition, noted in the origin of widespread use of gold clauses, 1 2 2 that the prime economic function of gold clauses was to protect the creditor against inflation. Devaluation is usually associated with inflation or, more precisely, with a more rapid rate of inflation than that of other countries. Inflation was not, however, the cause of the 1934 devaluation. Quite the contrary, for, as noted above, prices had fallen rapidly since 1929. Although periods of price declines had been common in American history, the 1929-33 decline had been uncommonly abrupt. 123 The purpose of the devalgold clause. Hence it is fatuous to argue that the gold clause was not bargained for. [50:504 Gold Clause Cases uation was not to bring the dollar exchange rate into correspondence with the relative purchasing power of the U.S. and foreign currencies. Instead, Roosevelt sought to generate inflation by forcing the exchange rate out of such correspondence. 124 This was in part what later critics had in mind when they sought through the Bretton Woods agreement to prevent such "competitive depreciation" of the currency. Thus, by 1933 holders of obligations that had been outstanding since 1928 or before had already experienced a considerable increase in the purchasing power of interest payments and in the implicit purchasing power of outstanding principal. To enforce the gold clause and thereby award a further increase in nominal dollars in interest and principal must have seemed to be rewarding the creditor twice over. A numerical example may help to explain this point. Assume that a $1000 bond was issued bearing a five percent interest rate (fifty dollars per annum) in 1929. Using the wholesale price index as a measure, that fifty dollars per annum would buy one-third more by 1933; thus it was worth over sixtyfive dollars in 1929 dollars. After the 1934 devaluation, enforcement of the gold clause would have increased the purchasing power of interest payments to $110 in 1929 dollars, an effective yield in real terms of eleven percent on the 1929 investment. 26 To be sure, the Roosevelt program was inflationary; by the time the Gold Clause Cases were decided in February 1935 wholesale prices had risen thirty-three percent above the 1933 nadir. The case for protecting creditors therefore should have seemed stronger than at the time of the Joint Resolution. But as wholesale prices were still nearly seventeen percent below the 1929 level, 1 27 the windfall argument was not entirely baseless.
V
The Treasury continued to buy gold at the new thirty-five-dol- 
(1933).
19831
The University of Chicago Law Review lar per ounce rate. Since this price made gold production here and abroad highly profitable and since the dollar was greatly undervalued as the result of the massive devaluation, gold began flowing into the Treasury coffers. The flow accelerated as fear of Nazi Germany spread in Europe. By 1939 U.S. gold holdings had increased to $17.6 billion from $7.4 billion in February 1934. 128 The U.S. gold purchases cannot be said to have placed the country on a gold standard because those gold inflows did not necessarily determine the money supply. In fact, the Treasury at one point adopted a "sterilization" policy to prevent any expansion of the money supply as a result of these gold inflows. 129 Still the U.S. policy of buying and selling gold at the official price of thirty-five dollars per ounce at the behest of foreign monetary authorities 1 3 0 became the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system. Under that system, gold was held by central banks and treasuries as international reserves, and the willingness of the United States, alone among major countries, to buy and sell gold at an official price was a key mechanism (together with intervention by foreign monetary authorities) holding together the set of fixed exchange rates that characterized the international monetary system from World War II until the early 1970's.31L
Looking backward from the 1980's it is sometimes thought that because of the commitment to buy and sell gold the United States was on a gold standard during the Bretton Woods period. But it was at best on what Milton Friedman has called a pseudogold standard and not on a real one. 1 32 There was no direct relation between U.S. gold holdings and the money supply. 33 Gold Clause Cases By 1960 the U.S. Treasury was more likely to be on the selling than the buying side of gold transactions. The dollar was at midpoint in a long passage from undervalued status during the "dollar shortage" period just after World War II to the overvalued status that led to the suspension of the gold undertaking in 1971. The Kennedy Administration came to power with the mission of preserving the U.S. gold commitment. The mission required, in its view, policies that would arrest the decline in U.S. gold holdings. 3 The most immediate threat was perceived to be the tendency of gold to rise above thirty-five dollars per ounce in private markets abroad. (There was, of course, no domestic market except for the tightly controlled market for newly mined gold and for industrial users.) Although the United States sold gold only to foreign monetary authorities, it feared arbitrage by central banks between the private and the official market, resulting in a gold outflow from the United States. 3 5
The Kennedy Administration therefore prohibited U.S. citizens from holding gold not just within the United States, as had been the case since 1934,18 but anywhere in the world. 1 '7 The notion was that U.S. citizens were likely to be on the buying side of foreign gold transactions and thereby to drive private gold prices higher. 138 Extraordinary efforts were made by the U.S. government to avoid foreign purchases in order to relieve balance of payments ments, Pub. L. No. 79-84, § 1, 59 Stat. 237, 237 (1945) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § § 248, 413-414 full-scale gold standard might come to be seen as a viable policy option by a much wider range of monetary experts and elected officials. On the other hand, the necessary precondition for consideration of a return to the gold standard, a long-term subsidence in inflation both here and abroad, would itself undermine much of the political case for such a return. The case for a gold standard is most appealing when inflation is rampant but, paradoxically, rapid inflation makes a gold standard impracticable.
reserves were still held in the form of gold at the end of 1981. Despite the decline in gold prices, global gold reserves were valued at $379.9 billion, as against a total for non-gold reserves of $396.3 billion. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL RE-PORT 162 (1982).
